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NOTES AND COMMENTS

asking the court to'direct the jailer to perform his ministerial duty as an
officer of the court and surrender the prisoner to the state authorities.
Combined with this request would have to be a prayer for an order
directing the state authorities to take him into custody.
Should the prisoner already be in a state prison when he realizes the
consequences of the delay in transfer, he may petition for a writ of habeas
corpus when the time spent in the state prison lus the period of detention in the county jail after trial equals the total sentence imposed, less
good conduct allowances, on the ground that he has completed service
of his sentence. 27 And, although there is no authority for such a course,
no good reason appears why he could not petition the court for a writ
of mandamus directing his release.
Two steps could be taken immediately without legislative or judicial
action, which would effect a partial remedy to this problem of wasted
time. The prison department could arrange for more frequent trips to
jails from which it gets road camp prisoners, or it could arrange to be
called when prisoners are awaiting transfer. 28 And, with careful preservation of prisoners' rights, a system of prompt waiver of appeal rights
in proper cases would serve to eliminate time wasted while the prisoner
is waiting for the expiration of the appeal period. A general tightening
up of all of the procedures involved between arrest and commencement
of sentence would immediately effect a saving of time for state prisoners
too often delayed en route from arrest to punishment, and would pay
for itself in the resulting decrease in county penal expenditures.
HARPER JOHNSTON ELAM, III.
Dead Bodies-Recovery for Wrongful Interference with or Neglect
North Carolina is in accord' with most jurisdictions in holding that
there is a quasi-property right in the body of a dead person for purposes
of interment. The surviving spouse has the paramount right to the body;
if there is no surviving spouse, the right goes to the next of kin. An
interference with the right to possess the body and bury it is a breach of
duty which may make the wrongdoer liable for damages including mental
anguish. 2 Generally, only the person having the right of burial may
maintain action for wrongs to the body. 3
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §17-3 (1943) ; Clark v. Surprenant, 94 F. 2d 969 (9th Cir.
1938) ; Alexander v. Posey, 32 Ala. App. 494, 27 So. 2d 237 (1946) ; Johnson v.
Lindsey, 89 Fla. 143, 103 So. 419 (1925) ; Whalen v. Cristell, 161 Kan. 747, 173
P. 2d 252 (1946) ; State ex rel. Murphy v. Wolfer, 127 Minn. 102, 148 N. W. 896
(1914).
" The assumption is made, of course, that the saving to the prisoners would

justify the added expense.
1

Kyles v. Southern Ry., 147 N. C. 394, 61 S. E. 278 (1908).
'Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 (1891); Kyles v. Southern Ry.
supra note 1; Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40 (1905) ; 25 C. J. S.,
Dead Bodies §§2-3, 8 (1941).
'Stephenson v. Duke University, 202 N. C. 624, 163 S. E. 598 (1932). See
Note 19 CORN. L. Q. 108, 111 (1933).
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While North Carolina has consistently held this right to be a property
right, the cases have not been in accord as to the reasons for conferring
such right nor as to the party possessing the right. The mother of a
son whose body had been mutilated has been denied the right to sue for
4
In
damage suffered as a direct result of the wrongful mutilation.
5 the Court held that the statute of disStephenson v. Duke University,
tributions no longer determined who possesses the right to the body,6
and spelled out its adherence to the majority theory: that the right to
possess the body, and therefore, to maintain action for injuries thereto,
grows out of the duty to bury the body.7 Yet, in Morrow v. Cline,s
without any discussion of the burial duty theory, the right to sue for
mutilation of their father's body was conferred upon minor children.9
In several respects the use of the duty to bury as the theoretical basis
for the right to maintain action for wrongs to the body leads to confused
reasoning and undesirable results. If the wrongdoer's act makes burial
impossible, so that there is no duty of burial on the plaintiff normally
having such duty, may the plaintiff nevertheless maintain an action
against the wrong doer?1O When a person without the duty to do so
buries a mutilated body, he is legally entitled to recover of the estate of
the deceased for expenses incurred in performing the burial,"1 thereby
diminishing the property available for distribution. Should not the
distributees, therefore, be entitled to sue the wrongdoer whose injury
to the body made interment more expensive?
If the right to maintain action for wrongs to the body is made to rest
upon the theory that the right grows out of the duty of burial, the es' Stephenson v. Duke University, supra note 3; Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line
Ry., 167 N. C. 55, 83 S. E. 12 (1914).
202 N. C. 624, 163 S. E. 598 (1932).
'In Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 167 N. C. 55, 83 S. E. 12 (1914), it was
held that there could be no question as to the father's exclusive right as he by the
statute of distributions was entitled to all of the personal property of the deceased.
The Steplinson case clearly reversed this holding-the statute does not apply.
I The established rule is that the right in the dead body grows out of the duty
of burial. Stephenson v. Duke University, 202 N. C. 624, 163 S. E. 598 (1932) ; 15
Am. JUR. 831 (1938).

Quaere: Do next of kin, as such, have a legal duty to bury their dead? The
common law casts the duty of burial on the person under whose roof death occurred.
17 C. J. 1142 (1919). The estate of the deceased is liable for funeral expenses.
Ray v. Honeycutt, 119 N. C. 510, 26 S. E. 127 (1896). A search of the authorities
has revealed no legal duty of burial on next of kin other than spouses and parents.
8 211 N. C. 254, 190 S. E. 207 (1937).
' Quaere: Do minors have a legal duty to bury their dead?
10 See Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N. Y. 249, 115 N. E. 715 (1917).
Where plaintiff's father died at sea and defendant's employees embalmed the body
so that it could have been kept without danger to the living, and the deceased had
ample funds to defray the expense of shipment home, his address being known, but
defendant's employee had the body thrown overboard, plaintiff was entitled to recover. There was a duty on defendant to deliver the body. See Bonaparte v.
Fraternal Funeral Home, 206 N. C. 652, 175 S. E. 137 (1934) where a widow recovered punitive damages for the wrongful withholding of her husband's body.
21See Ray v. Honeycutt, 119 N. C. 510, 26 S. E. 127 (1896).
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sential injury involved which is the outrage to the sensibilities of close
2
kin is ignored and the person most hurt may be denied recovery' having no right because he has no duty of burial. In fact, the right to
possess the body may not grow out of the duty to bury it,' 3 but the converse may be true.1 4 It is natural that someone should-by virtue of
intimate relationship or for other good reason-have a preferential right
to the body. But why should a preferential right in one survivor clothe
wrongdoers with immunity to action for mental anguish caused other
survivors? It is submitted that the better theory upon which to base
these cases is this: There is in the surviving spouse, children, parents
and other close kin'15 a right to have the body of the deceased treated
with due respect; an interference with that right is a breach of duty
and the wrongdoer may be held liable to any or all of them who suffer
injury.' 6 Such a rationale avoids the technical difficulties inherent in
the quasi property-burial duty theory and is more in accord with the
17
ends of justice.
ALLEN W. HARRELL.
1. "Obviously, in cases of this character, any pecuniary loss to plaintiff must
usually be merely trifling. The great injury done consists in the outrage upon the
sensibilities .... " Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 464, 102 N. W. 40, 44 (1905).

In a dissenting opinion in Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 167 N. C. 55, 62,

83 S. E. 12, 15 (1914), Clark, C. J., said: "This is a tort pure and simple, and the
wife is entitled to recover for it just as she has recovered in actions for failure to
deliver a telegram whereby she as well as her husband has suffered mental anguish."
He noted that by the very nature of the situation the mother is the person who most
naturally would suffer mental anguish in mutilation cases.
1 "The right had its origin in sentiment, in affection for the dead, in religious

belief
(1899).in some future life," O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285, 289, 55 Pac. 906, 907
9 Where the deceased's wife was absent and failed to assume the trust incident

to her right, a waiver was implied; the right of custody descended immediately to
the next of kin-the father of the deceased-and he, having the custody of the body,
had the duty of burial. Southern Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App.
5, 105 So. 161 (1925).
" In Boyle v. Chandler, 3 Harr. 323, 138 Atl. 273 (Del. 1927), the husband and
children of the deceased were permitted to maintain action. See Note, 19 CoRN. L. Q.
108, 112 (1933) which suggests that the immediate family be allowed a right of
action. In Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 458, 102 N. W. 40, 42 (1905), speaking
of the right in the dead body, the court said: "The person having charge of it
He holds it only as a sacred trust .. . a
cannot be considered as the owner....
court of equity might control the exercise of those rights by one relative with due
regard to the interest of others ....
"In Koerber v. Patek, supra note 15, it was said that there is no right more
sacred to the individual than the right to bury the dead, none where the court need
less hesitate to impose upon a willful violator the uttermost consequences of his
act. In Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 312, 50 N. W. 238, 240 (1891) the court,
commenting on a case in which defendant had dug up the body of plaintiff's child,
noted that the recovery was made to rest upon the trespass to the land and said:
"It would be a reproach to law if a plaintiff's right to recover for mental anguish
resulting from the mutilation or other disturbance of the remains of his dead
should be made to depend upon whether in committing the act the defendant also
committed a technical trespass upon plaintiff's premises, while everybody's common
sense would tell him that the real and substantial wrong was not the trespass on
land but the indignity to the dead." It would seem equally a reproach to law if
recovery is made to depend upon whether plaintiff was under a duty to bury the

body.
17

In Matthews v. Forrest, 235 N. C. 281, 285, 69 S. E. 2d 553, 556 (1952),

